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Abstract
A "problem solver" (PS) is an agent who when interacting with other agents
does not "put himself in their shoes" but rather chooses a best response to a
uniform distribution over all possible congurations consistent with the infor-
mation he receives about the other agentsmoves.
We demonstrate the special features of a PS by analyzing a modied coordi-
nation game. In the rst stage, each of the other participants - who are treated
as conventional players - chooses a location. The PS then receives some partial
information about their moves and chooses his location. The PS wishes to co-
ordinate with any one of the conventional players and they wish to coordinate
with him but not with each other. Equilibria are characterized and shown to
have di¤erent properties than those of Nash equilibria when the PS is treated
as a conventional player.
The rst author thanks the Henry Crown Institute of Business Research in Israel
for nancial support.
The second author acknowledges nancial support from ERC grant 269143.
Our thanks go to Noga Alon, Ayala Arad, Kr Eliaz, Gil Kalai and Rani Spiegler
for their comments.
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1. Introduction
Consider a gamelike situation in which all agents but one choose their actions
in the rst stage and the other agent chooses his action after receiving some
information about the choices made in the rst stage. According to the standard
game-theoretic approach, the second-stage player "puts himself in the shoes"
of the rst-stage players, forms beliefs about their behavior, updates his beliefs
according to the information he received and responds optimally to those beliefs.
However, there are situations in which the second-stage player does not base his
choice on the beliefs he forms about the other agentsmoves but rather on the
set of congurations of actions consistent with what he observes.
For example, imagine that someone has written a crossword puzzle and o¤ers
you a prize if you can solve it. It is unlikely that you will think much about
his "strategy". It is more likely that you will use your knowledge and powers of
logic to ll in the crossword based on the clues given.
Alternatively, imagine a situation in which someone writes the names of two
countries (members of the UN), each on a di¤erent card, and places them face
down in front of you. You are told that each name has four di¤erent letters
and that they have three letters in common. Your task is to guess one of the
two names. You will eventually come to the conclusion that the only possible
conguration is {Iran, Iraq} and thus either of them will be a successful guess.
However, what would be your guess if you are told that the two names share
precisely two letters. In that case, there are three possible pairs: {Chad,Cuba},
{Iran, Mali} and {Iraq,Mali}. If you arent thinking strategically about the
motives of the person who chose the two countries, then your guess will probably
be Mali, since it appears in two of the possible congurations whereas the others
appear in only one.
Finally, imagine you are considering entering a particular market of several
similar products (such as breakfast cereals) with an incumbent who produces all
the products. You observe your competitors cumulative prots but not their
breakdown by product. You need to decide which of the products to produce if
you enter the market. In such a situation, you are likely to rst compute values
for the unknowns that are consistent with what you observe and then assign
probabilities to each consistent scenario, rather than forming beliefs about the
competitors moves and updating them according to what you observe.
In these examples, agents do not think strategically but rather reason as if
they were solving a puzzle. Accordingly, we introduce a new type of economic
agent, which we refer to as a problem solver (PS). The PS interacts with the
other agents and receives only partial information about their moves; he does
not deliberate about their motives. We assume that the PS calculates the set
of possible congurations of the other playersmoves that are consistent with
what he observes and chooses a best response to the uniform distribution over
that set. For the PS, nding all the congurations of moves that are consistent
with what he observes is like solving a puzzle.
The platform we use to demonstrate the idea is a new version of the coor-
dination game. The agents in the interaction are labelled 0; 1; ::; n. Each agent
3
chooses an alternative from a set X. Agent 0 is the PS and the other n agents
are treated as conventional players. The PS is interested in coordinating his
choice with one of the other players. Each of the players 1; ::; n would like to
coordinate with the PS and to avoid coordinating with any other player. Players
1; ::; n rst make their choices simultaneously, following which the PS receives
some information about their choices and then makes his own.
If the PS is treated as a conventional player, then the game would have many
trivial pure equilibria which do not make much sense. In fact, regardless of the
information player 0 receives, every prole of n distinct choices, one of which
is chosen by player 0 with probability 1, is consistent with a pure sequential
equilibrium. The success of the coordination is due to player 0s knowledge of
the equilibrium. The information player 0 receives regarding the other n players
is superuous.
We suggest a di¤erent approach according to which player 0 is a problem
solver. He identies all the proles of the playerschoices that are consistent
with the data he receives and treats them as equally likely. He then chooses
an action in order to maximize the chance that his choice will match that of at
least one of the other players.
We analyze the equilibria of the modied game assuming that the set X
is a large matrix and the PS observes only the number of players located in
each row and in each column of the matrix. The equilibrium of the model in
the presence of a problem solver di¤ers signicantly from that of the above
coordination game in which the PS is treated as a conventional player. We show
that in all equilibria, the PS coordinates with one of the players with certainty.
However, an interesting phenomenon emerges: There exist equilibria in which
the PS chooses a position in the matrix which he believes might be vacant even
though it is occupied with certainty. Such a phenomenon would not arise in the
case that the PS is a conventional player.
The concept of a PS in this paper is strongly linked to the idea of an Articial
Intelligence (AI) agent. An AI agent is one that receives percepts from the
environment and performs actions in order to maximize its chance of success
in achieving some goal (see, for example, Russell and Norwig (2009)). Our PS
has exactly these features: The environment is the playersactions. The partial
information received by the PS concerns the playersmoves. The PS goal is to
maximize the chances of choosing an occupied entry.
2. The model
Consider the following "romantic game". There are n men, each of whom
would like to be picked by a certain woman. Each man has to declare his favorite
country to vacation in (from a set A), as well as his favorite cuisine (from a set
B). The declarations dont have to be truthful. Men would like to be viewed
as unique. In other words, they do not want to be viewed as having the same
pair of characteristics as other men. The woman gets to view the distributions
of the declared countries and the declared cuisines, after which she declares the
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type of man (i.e., a pair in A  B) that she is willing to be matched with. If
her declaration does not match any of the mens declarations, then everyone is
disappointed. If there is a man whose declaration matches hers, they are happy
and the other men feel miserable.
Formally, there are n+ 1 agents. We refer to agent 0 as a PS and to agents
1; ::; n as players. Each agent chooses a position, which is a pair of characteristics
in the set X = AB (where A and B are nite and disjoint sets). For simplicity,
assume that both A and B contain at least n elements. Consistent with the
convention in chess, we refer to the elements of A as columns and to the elements
of B as rows. A product set of columns and rows is called a box.
The n players make their choices simultaneously. The PS observes only the
number of occupied entries in each column and row. With that information he
chooses his position.
The PS gains utility of 1 if his choice coincides with that of one of the
players and 0 otherwise. Each of the players 1; ::; n gains utility of 1 if his choice
coincides only with that of the PS,  1 if his choice coincides with that of at
least one of the other players and 0 otherwise. (In the nal section, we analyze
two variants of the model. In the rst, a player does not have disutiluty from
making the same choice as another player and if the PS picks an entry chosen by
more than one player he is randomly matched with one of them. The second is
a version of the hide-and-seek game: the PS wants to pick a player and players
want not to be picked by the PS.)
Given these preferences, we can conne ourselves to strategy proles in which
no two players occupy the same position. An outcome of the n playerschoices is
a matrix M = (Ma;b); where Ma;b 2 f0; 1g; with n 1s. The notation Ma;b = 1
signies that the position (a; b) is occupied and Ma;b = 0 signies that it is
vacant. The PS observes only the data vector d(M) = (d(M)(x))x2A[B where
d(M)(x) is the number of players occupying entries with a characteristic x in
the matrix M (i.e., d(M)(a) = 
l
Mal and d(M)(b) = kMkb). A vector d is
consistent if there is a matrix M such that d = d(M). By denition, the PS
observes a consistent data vector. We refer to d(a) + d(b) as the score of the
entry (a; b).
The PS assumes that all matrices consistent with the data he observes are
equally likely and randomly picks an entry with the highest probability of being
occupied. Formally, a matrix M is said to be d-consistent if d(M) = d. Let
(d; x) be the proportion of d-consistent matrices, in which x is occupied. If
(d; x) = 1, we say that x is revealed to be occupied by d. If (d; x) = 0, we say
that x is revealed to be vacant by d. Hereafter, we use the term "revealed" to
mean "revealed to be occupied". We say that the matrix M is revealed if it is
the only matrix consistent with d(M). Denote by C(M) = fx j (d(M); x) is
maximalg the set of all entries with the highest probability of being occupied,
given d(M). The probability that the PS picks x is (M;x) = 1=jC(M)j for
each x 2 C(M) and (M;x) = 0 for each x =2 C(M).
An equilibrium is a matrixM such that no player can increase his probability
of being picked by moving to a vacant entry. Formally, let M(x ! y) be the
matrix derived fromM after switching the values of entries x and y. The matrix
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M is an equilibrium if, for each occupied entry x, (M;x)  ((M(x ! y); y)
for any entry y that is not occupied in M .
Example 1: Consider the following matrices with n = 5 (vacant rows and
columns are not depicted).
M1 =
1 1 1
1 0 0
1 0 0
M2 =
1 1 1
1 1 0
0 0 0
M3 =
1 1 1 1 1
   
The matrix M1 is revealed. Thus, the probability of each occupied entry
being picked is 1=5. However, M1 is not an equilibrium. If the occupier of 
moves to , the new data vector will be ((2; 2; 1); (2; 2; 1)); which is consistent
with 5 matrices, such that each of the four entries (a; b) for which (d(a); d(b)) =
(2; 2) is occupied in 4 of the 5 matrices. Each of the 4 entries (a; b) for which
(d(a); d(b)) is (2; 1) or (1; 2) is occupied in 2 of the 5 matrices. The unique entry
(a; b), for which (d(a); d(b)) = (1; 1), is occupied in only one of the d-consistent
matrices. Thus, by moving from  to  the mover increases his probability of
being picked from 1=5 to 1=4.
The matrix M2 is revealed but is not an equilibrium since the player who
occupies  can increase his probability of being picked from 1=5 to 1=3 by moving
to .
The matrixM3 is revealed and is an equilibrium. If the player at  moves to
an entry such as  (which does not share any characteristics with the other four
occupied entries), then the new data vector will be consistent with 5 matrices
and in only one of them is  occupied. Each of the other occupied entries is
occupied in 4 of the 5 matrices consistent with the new data and thus the mover
reduces his probability of being picked from 1=5 to 0. If the occupier of  moves
to an entry such as  (which shares one characteristic with one other occupied
entry), then the new matrix will also be revealed and the player gains nothing
by moving.
Comment : Notice that the coordination problem which arises here is very
di¤erent from that due to the lack of common language regarding the avail-
able alternatives, as discussed, for example, in Crawford and Haller (1990) and
Bacharach (1993). In fact, if the PS in our model interacts with only one player
then coordination is trivial since the PS receives full information about the lo-
cation of the player. What makes coordination non-trivial in our model is the
lack of strategic reasoning on the part of the PS and the partial information he
observes about the locations of the players, information that might not enable
him to identify an occupied entry.
3. The Problem Solvers Behavior
In this section, we present some properties of the set of matrices that are con-
sistent with a given data set. These properties determine the Problem Solvers
"response function". In particular, we will show that either:
(1) The set of entries that are revealed to be occupied is nonempty (and
consists of all entries with a score above a certain number) and the PS randomly
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picks one of the revealed entries;
or
(2) No entry is revealed and the PS randomly picks one of the entries with
the maximal score.
Claim 1: Let d be a consistent data vector such that d(1) > d(2), where
1 and 2 are elements of A. Then, for all b 2 B; (d; (1; b))  (d; (2; b)).
Furthermore, if there is a d-consistent matrix M such that for some b, M1;b = 1
and M2;b = 0 , then (d; (1; b)) > (d; (2; b)).
Proof : Let b 2 B. Fix the values for all entries other than those in columns
1 and 2: Partition the class C of all d-consistent matrices with these xed values
outside columns 1 and 2 into four cells, denoted by M(; );  2 f0; 1g ;  2
f0; 1g, such thatM(; ) is the cell in this partition that consists of the matrices
for whichM1;b =  and M2;b = . We will show that jM(1; 0)j  jM(0; 1)j and
if M(1; 0) is not empty, then the inequality is strict. This is su¢ cient since if
there is a d-consistent matrix M such that M1;b = 1 and M2;b = 0, then for at
least one set of entries in columns B   f1; 2g we have M(1; 0) 6= ;.
We rst show that ifM(1; 0) = ;, thenM(0; 1) = ;: IfM(0; 1) is not empty,
then there isM 2 C withM1;b = 0 andM2;b = 1. By d(1) > d(2), there is a row
b0 where M1;b0 = 1 and M2;b0 = 0. Switching all values in f1; 2g  fb; b0g (i.e.,
changing all 0s to 1s and vice versa), we obtain another matrix in C which is
inM(1; 0). Therefore, ifM(1; 0) is empty, then the number of matrices in C in
which M1;b = 1 is the same as the number of matrices in /C in which M2;b = 1.
We next show that ifM(1; 0) 6= ;, then the number of elements inM(0; 1) is
strictly smaller than that inM(1; 0). Dene L1;1 to be the set of rows in which
the data regarding the rows implies that the missing values in columns 1 and 2
are (1; 1), and dene L0;0 in a similar manner. For the rows in B   L11   L00,
the data dictates that the missing values in columns 1 and 2 be either (0; 1) or
(1; 0). It must be that in any (1) = d(1)   jL1;1j of these rows the values in
the two columns are (1; 0) and in the other (2) = d(2)  jL1;1j rows the values
must be (0; 1). Thus, jM(1; 0)j = C((1)   1; (1) + (2)   1) > jM(0; 1)j =
C((1); (1) + (2)  1) where C(k; l) is the number of sets of size k in a set of
size l. The strict inequality follows from the fact that (1) > (2). 
Claim 2: Let d be a consistent data set. Assume that (a,b) maximizes
the score over AB and is not revealed. Then, for any cell (a; b) that does not
maximize the score (d; (a; b)) > (d; (a; b)).
Proof : By Claim 1, without loss of generality, it is su¢ cient to show that
(d; (a; b)) > (d; (a; b)) for any a for which d(a) > d(a). Also by claim 1,
it is su¢ cient to show that there exists a matrix M consistent with d, such that
Ma;b = 1 and Ma;b = 0.
Since 1 > (d; (a; b)), there exists a d-consistent matrix M with Ma;b =
0. Since d(a) > d(a); there must be some b 2 B with Ma;b = 1 and Ma;b = 0.
IfMa;b = 1, then by switching the values in the four entries fa; agfb; bg,
we obtain a d-consistent M 0 with M 0a;b = 1 and M
0
a;b = 0.
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b 0 1
b 1 0
a a
If Ma;b = 0, then since b maximizes d over B, there also exists an a0 such
that Ma0;b = 1 and Ma0;b = 0. By switching the values in fa; a0g fb; bg, we
obtain a d-consistent matrix M 0 with M 0a;b = 1 and M
0
a;b = 0.
b 0 0 1
b 1 0 0
a a a0

Claim 3: Let M be a matrix such that the box C R is occupied and the
"dual" box Cc  Rc is vacant. Then, each element in C  R is revealed to be
occupied and each element in the dual box is revealed to be vacant.
R 1 1 1 ? ?
R 1 1 1 ? ?
? ? ? 0 0
? ? ? 0 0
? ? ? 0 0
C C C
Proof: Given a data vector d and a set E of rows or columns, let d(E) =P
e2E d(e). It must be that d(M
)(Cc) + d(M)(Rc) + jCj  jRj = n. On the
other hand, for every matrix M such that Ma;b = 0 for some (a; b) 2 C R; it
must be that d(M)(Cc) + d(M)(Rc) +jCj  jRj > n and thus M is inconsistent
with d(M). An analogous argument can be used to show that the positions in
the dual box are revealed to be vacant. 
Let d be a consistent data vector. Order the elements of A so that d(a1) 
d(a2)  ::::  d(ajAj) and order the elements of B so that d(b1)  d(b2) 
::::  d(bjBj). By Claim 1, if (ai; bj) is revealed to be occupied, then so are
all the entries in the box fa1; ::; aig  fb1; ::; bjg. Thus, the set of revealed
entries is a "step set". That is, there is a sequence of disjoint sets of columns
A(1); A(2); :::; A(I) and a sequence of disjoint sets of rows B(1); B(2); :::; B(I)
such that (i) the set of revealed (to be occupied) entries is [i+jI+1(A(j) 
B(i)), (ii) the d-value is constant over each A(i) (or B(i)) and (iii) the d-
value of any entry in A(i) (or B(i)) is larger than the d-value of any entry
in A(j) (or B(j)) where j > i. (In the illustration below the sequences are
fa1; a2g; fa3g; fa4; a5g; fa6g and fb1g; fb2; b3g; fb4g; fb5g)).
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b1 Y Y Y Y Y Y X
b2 Y Y Y Y Y X Z
b3 Y Y Y Y Y X Z
b4 Y Y Y X X Z Z
b5 Y Y X Z Z Z Z
b6 X X Z Z Z Z Z
b7 X X Z Z Z Z Z
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7
In what follows, we denote the step set of revealed entries by Y = [i+jI+1A(i)
B(j), the dual step set by Z = [i+jI+3A(i)B(j) and the union of the boxes
between Y and Z by X = [i+j=I+2A(i)B(j).
Claim 4: Let d be a consistent data vector. Assume that the set of revealed
elements Y is not empty. Then, every element in the dual step set Z is revealed
to be vacant.
Proof: Given a consistent data vector d; the Gale-Ryser algorithm (see Gale
(1957), Ryser (1957) and Krause (1996)) ends with a d-consistent matrix. The
algorithm is sequential and starts with a certain initial matrix. In each step of
the algorithm, a permissible pair of entries that are positioned in the same row
one occupied and the other vacant is selected and their values are swapped.
To be precise, order the elements in each of the sets A and B according to their
d-values a1; :::; ajAj and b1; :::; bjBj. The algorithm starts with a matrix M0 in
which, for any row b, 1s are assigned to the entries in columns a1; :::; ad(b) of
this row. For M0, the number of 1s in column ak is z(k) = jfb j the number
d(b)  kgj. Obviously, Pi=1;::;k z(i)  Pi=1;::;k d(ai) for all k. In each step of
the algorithm, a "1" in the lowest index column for which the number of 10s is
strictly greater than d(a) is moved to the rst column a0 in which the number
of 10s is strictly less than d(a0).
In his proof that the algorithm ends with a d-consistent matrix, Krause
(1996) shows that the algorithm works by starting with any matrix having the
following two properties: (i) The number of 1s in each b 2 B is d(b) and (ii)
for each k, the sum of the 1s in the rst k columns is at least as large asP
i=1;::;k d(ai).
Note that if
P
i=1;::;j z(j) =
P
i=1;::;i d(ai), then for every d-consistent
matrix the entries in fa1; ::; aig fb1; ::; bjg must be occupied and the entries
in (A  fa1; ::; aig) (B   fb1; ::; bjg)must be vacant.
Thus, to prove Claim 4, it is su¢ cient to show that, for all l,
P
i=1;::;jA(1)j+:::+jA(l)j z(i) =P
i2A(1)[:::[A(l) d(ai). Assume not. Then, for some l we have
P
i=1;::;jA(1)j+:::+jA(l)j z(i) >P
i2A(1)[:::[A(l) d(ai). Let k
 be the lowest k > jA(1)j + ::: + jA(l)j for whichP
i=1;::;k z(i) =
P
i=1;::;k d(ai). It must be that d(bjB(1)j+:::+jB(I+1 l)j) < k
.
Otherwise, z(bjB(1)j+:::+jB(I+1 l)j)  k and in any d-consistent matrix all en-
tries in fa1; ::; akg fb1; ::; bjB(1)j+:::+jB(I+1 l)jg are occupied, in contradiction
to the denition of jA(l)j. Now start the Gale-Ryser algorithm from a matrix
that modiesM0 by moving a single "1" from the entry (ajA(1)j+:::+jA(l)j; bjB(1)j+:::+jB(I+1 l)j)
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to the empty entry (ak ; bjB(1)j+:::+jB(I+1 l)j). The matrix satises properties
(i) and (ii) and thus the algorithm starting with the modied matrix leads to a
d-consistent matrix in which one of the revealed entries is 0, a contradiction. 
4. Equilibrium
In this section, we show that in all equilibria the PS picks an occupied
entry with probability 1 (Proposition 1) and we classify the structure of all
equilibria (Proposition 2). Even though in every equilibrium the PS picks an
occupied entry for certain, there are equilibria in which the PS assigns a strictly
positive probability to the possibility that the position he is picking is vacant
(Proposition 3).
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, the PS picks an occupied entry with prob-
ability 1.
Proof : Let M be an equilibrium. If there are revealed positions, then the
PS obviously chooses one of them. If no entry is revealed, then, by Claim 2,
C(M) is the box of all the entries that maximize the d(M) score. It is left to
show that all entries in C(M) are occupied.
If an entry (a; b) outside C(M) is occupied and (a; b) 2 C(M) is va-
cant, then the move from (a; b) to (a; b) is benecial: the score of (a; b) in
M((a; b) ! (a; b)) increases by at least 1 relative to the score in M and the
score of any other entry increases by at most 1. Thus, (a; b) maximizes the
score after the move, and by Claim 1 it will be picked with a positive probability.
If all the occupied entries are in C(M) and it contains a vacant entry, then
any vertical move from an occupied entry (a; b) to a vacant entry (a; b) is ben-
ecial since: (i) (a; b) maximizes the score after the move, (ii) C(M((a; b)!
(a; b)))  C(M) and (iii) the entry (a; b) is obviously not revealed and, by
Claim 2, it is excluded from C(M((a; b)! (a; b))). 
Proposition 2: If M is an equilibrium, it must have one of the following
three structures:
(1) The matrix M is revealed and forms a "step set". The PS picks one of
the occupied positions.
(2) There is a "step set" of entries that are revealed as occupied and the
PS picks one of them. The "dual step set" is revealed to be vacant. Each box
lying between these two sets contains at least three occupied entries that are
not picked by the PS.
(3) None of the positions are revealed to be occupied. All positions with
maximal score are occupied and the PS picks one of them.
Proof : The fact that the set of revealed entries forms a step set follows from
Claim 1. By Claim 4, the dual step set is revealed to be vacant.
Assume thatM is an equilibrium in which some, but not all, occupied entries
are revealed. We will show that any box A0  B0 in area X (i.e., the area
consisting of all the positions between Y , the set of entries that are revealed as
occupied, and Z, the set of entries that are revealed to be vacant) contains at
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least three occupied entries that do not share any characteristic (namely, they
are positioned in three di¤erent rows and three di¤erent columns). If A0B0 is
entirely vacant, then a move from an unrevealed occupied entry into this empty
box will be benecial to the mover since it will reveal this entry to be occupied
(by Claim 3). It is impossible that all occupied entries in this box lie in the same
row or the same column since (again, by Claim 3) they would then be revealed.
It is also impossible that in equilibrium all occupied entries in this box lie in
exactly two rows (or two columns) since if (a1; b1) and (a2; b2) in that box are
occupied then a move from (a1; b1) to (a1; b2) is benecial since the deviator
will be revealed (once again, by Claim 3).
Finally, if none of the positions are revealed as occupied, then, by claim 2,
C(M) contains all of the positions with the highest score and, by the proof of
Proposition 1, all of the entries in C(M) must be occupied. 
An interesting feature of the model is that although in equilibrium the PS
always picks an occupied position, there are equilibria in which he does not
know that the position is occupied. Such a phenomenon could not occur under
the conventional equilibrium assumption but may emerge in our setup.
Proposition 3: For n  10; there exists an equilibrium in which the PS
picks an occupied entry although it is not revealed to be occupied.
Proof : The matrix M4 demonstrates such an equilibrium for n = 10. The
example can be modied for any n > 10 by "extending" the "arms of the top-left
L".
M4 =
1 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
No entry is revealed by d(M4) and the PS chooses the top-left position x
which achieves the maximum score of 8, whereas any other entry achieves a
score of at most 5. (The PS assigns a probability of 2400/2850  0:85 to x
being occupied.) For any occupied entry x 6= x and unoccupied entry y, no
entry is revealed in M4(x ! y) and x remains the entry with the highest
score in M4(x! y) (being equal to 7 or 8 whereas the score of y would not be
higher than 6). By Claim 2; x would still be chosen by the PS given the data
d(M4(x! y)). Thus, no deviation is protable. 
Comment: Were the PS to take into account that the n playersprole of
choices is consistent with Nash equilibrium, he would conclude that the entry
he is choosing is occupied. However, the whole point of modeling an agent as
a problem solver is that he does not think strategically. Rather, he treats the
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problem as a puzzle to be solved, using the information he possesses, without
making any assumptions about the various solutions to the puzzle.
5. Two variants of the model
(a) Players can share entries
Thus far we have assumed that none of the players want to share an entry
with another player regardless of whether or not the entry is picked by the PS.
Assume now that players do not have disutility from sharing an entry with an-
other player. Once the PS has chosen an occupied cell he randomly picks one of
the occupiers and each player is interested in increasing the probability of being
picked. Formally, a players utility is 1=k if he shares the PSs chosen cell with
k  1 other players and 0 otherwise. A matrix is an assignment of non-negative
integers (not necessarily zeros or ones) to all entries, such that the sum of the
numbers in all entries is n. For each row (column), the PS receives information
about the total number of players occupying that row (column). The PS iden-
ties the matrices that are consistent with the data and then randomly picks
an entry with the largest number of consistent matrices in which this entry is
occupied (by at least one player). For example, the data d(a1) = d(b1) = 3 and
d(a2) = d(b2) = 1 is consistent with two matrices:
2 1
1 0
and
3 0
0 1
.
Only the top-left entry is occupied in both matrices and therefore it is picked
by the PS.
An equilibrium is a matrix such that a player who occupies one entry can-
not increase his utility by moving to another. Formally, in equilibrium there
is no occupied entry x and (not necessarily unoccupied) entry y such that
((M(x!y);y)
M(y)+1 >
(M;x)
M(x) where M(x ! y) is the matrix in which x is decreased
by 1 and y is increased by 1.
Obviously, any matrix in which the n players occupy n entries in one row or
in one column is an equilibrium (since the move of a player to another occupied
entry reduces his utility from 1=n to 1=(2n  2) and the move of a player to an
unoccupied entry cannot increase the probability of being picked by the PS).
We are able to prove that any other matrix is not an equilibrium (with the
exception of n = 2 with the two players occupying the same entry). The proof
is not presented here but can be obtained from the authors.
(b) Players dont want to be picked by the PS
Suppose that none of the n players wishes to be "detected" by the PS. More
precisely, each player receives a utility of 1 if he discoordinates with the PS, 0
if his choice matches that of the PS and negative utility if he chooses the same
entry as one of the other players.
Any diagonal matrix M , in which each player chooses a distinct row and a
distinct column, is an equilibrium. Given d(M), the PS will select each of the
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n2 entries with the score 2 and thus a players probability of being detected by
the PS is 1=n2.
Consider the matrixM(x! y) that results from the move of a player from an
occupied entry x to an unoccupied entry y; where y is an entry that shares a row
or a column with one of the occupied entries in M . The score of y in M(x! y)
is maximal and thus it is one of at most n(n 1) entries in C(M(x! y)): Thus,
the move from x to y increases a players probability of being detected.
In any other matrix M , the minimal box that contains all occupied entries
is of size kl, where k  n and l  n; with at least one of the inequalities being
strict. Then, there is an occupied entry in M with a score strictly greater than
2. Any player who occupies an entry x with a maximal score will benet by
moving to an entry y; which does not share a row or column with any other
player, since such a move reduces his chances of being picked by the PS from
1
kl to at most maxf 1(k+1)l ; 1k(l+1)g.
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